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Social psychology has always been opportunistic 
when it comes to method, eagerly availing itself 
of new methodologies developed in other fi elds. 
In the study of group processes and intergroup 
relations, these methodological shifts have 
initiated periods of unusual productivity and 
growth. For example, systematic observational 
methods, fi rst developed in medicine, provided 
the basis for the foundational work in group 
dynamics conducted in the 1930s, 1940s and 
1950s. Experimental methods, pioneered in the 
fi eld of perception and psychophysics, led to 
seminal research by Sherif (1936) on group in-
fl uence and Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939) on 
group dynamics and leadership (Jones, 1998). 
More recently, methods developed in cognitive 
psychology, especially those using computer-
based paradigms and reaction-time measures, 
have led to impressive advances in the study of 
intergroup relations (Fazio & Olson, 2003).
The newest opportunity on the methodo-
logical horizon comes from developments in 
neuroscience. Recent advances in functional 
neuroimaging techniques, for example, have 
enabled researchers to measure indirectly neural 
activity in awake and behaving humans. Thus, 
the question of what neural events mediate 
between stimulus and response has suddenly 
become much more tractable. Not surprisingly, 
psychologists have rushed to embrace these new 
methodologies, which promise a deeper and more 
fi ne-grained understanding of the mental pro-
cesses that defi ne human experience. Social 
psychologists, including those interested in 
groups, have been no exception. The result of 
their efforts is the burgeoning fi eld of social 
neuroscience.
This Special Issue offers a diverse set of theor-
etical and empirical articles that highlight re-
cent advances in this fi eld. These contributions 
address time-honored questions about intra-
group and intergroup processes: How do per-
ceptions of ingroup and outgroup members 
differ? How do people perceive status cues? 
When are outgroup members threatening? 
How does perspective-taking work? What does 
it feel like to be stigmatized? How do women 
and men differ in emotional responding? Exten-
sive literatures exist on all of these topics. What 
the present contributions add to this earlier 
work is a different kind of answer to these time-
honored questions, one that treats the underlying 
intrapsychic processes with great depth and 
precision.
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Indeed, their high degree of precision about 
psychological process accounts for much of 
the scientifi c appeal of neuroscience methods. 
Consider, for example, the question of whether 
women and men differ in emotional respond-
ing. The behavioral evidence is equivocal on this 
question, even if one distinguishes behavior-
ally between emotional reactivity and emotion 
regulation. However, at a neural level, gender 
differences emerge, refl ecting differences in 
how women and men regulate negative affect 
(McRae, Ochsner, Mauss, Gabrieli, and Gross, 
this issue). Men, it appears, may use conscious 
control to suppress negative affect, whereas 
women may generate positive affect to offset 
the negative. This ability to distinguish a reduc-
tion in negative affect from an increase in positive 
affect—that is, to parse psychological processes 
this fi nely—is characteristic of research using 
neuroscience methods. With these methods, 
researchers can isolate specifi c processes and 
distinguish them from their close cousins. They 
can distinguish perceptions of threat from 
perceptions of dominance (Chiao et al. this 
issue), for example, or misregulation from 
underregulation (Derks, Inzlicht, and Kang, 
this issue). 
Another dimension on which measures of 
neural activity offer increased precision over 
behavioral methods is timing. Processing of 
a social stimulus does not occur in an instant; 
rather, it unfolds over time, with attention shift-
ing to different aspects of the stimulus at dif-
ferent stages of processing. For example, studies 
of the role of race in face processing have shown 
that people fi rst attend to whether the face is 
the same race or a different race than their own, 
then to the familiarity of the face, and then to 
whether the face is the same race or a different 
race than the one that preceded it (Willadsen-
Jensen and Ito, this issue). These shifts of at-
tention occur extremely rapidly, all within ap-
proximately 500 ms. Thus, measures that require 
a behavioral response are too crude to pick them 
up. However, event-related potentials (ERPs), 
recorded continuously as a participant views the 
stimulus, can provide data on neural responses 
that refl ect those shifts in attention. With these 
data, researchers can draw inferences about how 
important group membership is in person 
perception—how much attention it receives 
and how early it receives that attention. Note 
that not all neural measurement techniques 
can provide these data. For example, functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) provides 
very good information on spatial patterns of 
neural activity, but very poor information on 
the timing of that activity. ERPs, on the other 
hand, provide just the reverse: good time 
resolution but poor spatial resolution. Thus, 
ERPs are the method of choice for examining 
temporal patterns in attention to social category 
and status information (Chiao et al., this issue; 
Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, this issue).
A third feature that contributes to the appeal 
of neuroscience methods is the range of pro-
cesses they measure in parallel. Consider, for 
example, a recent study by Krendl, Richeson, 
Kelley, and Heatherton (2008) on the neural 
processes underlying stereotype threat. In this 
study, women were induced to experience stereo-
type threat regarding their math performance 
while fMRI measured their brain activity. Com-
pared with women who were not induced to 
experience stereotype threat, the threatened 
women showed less recruitment of neural regions 
associated with math learning and performance 
and more recruitment of regions associated with 
emotion regulation and the processing of social 
feedback. Thus, the performance decrement 
associated with stereotype threat appears to 
result from two separate processes, one cognitive 
and the other emotional, working in concert. 
To reach this conclusion, the researchers had 
to be able to measure both of these processes 
simultaneously and implicitly. Of the methods 
available today, only fMRI has this capacity. 
Indeed, neuroimaging has enabled researchers 
to chart the interplay of cognitive and affective 
processes in a variety of domains (see Derks, 
Inzlicht, and Kang, this issue; McRae et al., this 
issue; Richeson, Todd, Trawalter, and Baird, 
this issue).
A final appeal of neuroscience methods 
is that they facilitate integration of social psy-
chological fi ndings with related research on 
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diverse populations, including children, clinical 
patients, and nonhuman primates. Until recently, 
such integration has been diffi cult to accomplish. 
Researchers have analyzed behavioral patterns 
across human populations and species, but these 
analyses have afforded only limited insight into 
psychological process. Studies of process, on 
the other hand, have used measures that have 
limited utility beyond high-functioning, adult 
populations (e.g., self-reports, reaction times). 
One of the promises of social neuroscience, for 
the study of groups in particular, is an integrated 
view of the psychological processes that under-
lie collective living. Indeed, diverse populations 
provide valuable perspectives on the evolved 
biological systems that neuroscience methods 
measure. Thus, once social psychologists adopt 
this level of analysis, comparative, develop-
mental, and clinical psychology become potential 
sources of valuable insight. This insight is al-
ready evident in the study of perspective-taking 
(Mason and Macrae, this issue), perceptions of 
dominance (Chiao et al., this issue), and inter-
group threat (Richeson et al., this issue).
We have focused on the ways in which neuro-
science methods promise to enhance the study 
of group processes and intergroup relations. 
Despite this promise, however, social psycholo-
gists are not united in their enthusiasm for the 
wide-spread adoption of these methods. There 
are many, very legitimate reasons for concern 
(see Dovidio, Pearson, and Orr, this issue), one 
of which, we believe, drives much of the anxiety. 
The fact is that neural measures are limited 
in what they can reveal about group life—limited 
in the questions they can be used to address and 
in the answers they can provide to those ques-
tions. In this respect, neural measures are no 
different from any other single, methodological 
approach to studying social psychological pro-
cesses. But as the fi eld embraces neuroscience 
methods, as funding agencies preferentially 
allocate funds for this kind of research, and 
as neural evidence for psychological process 
becomes more common, many researchers are 
coming to fear that these methods will defi ne the 
fi eld—that is, that neural evidence for process 
will become the accepted standard of good 
research. There is no question that this would 
be a negative outcome. If the fi eld of group 
processes and intergroup relations came to 
be defi ned by the questions that neuroscience 
methods can address, it would be a far less 
interesting, generative, and creative fi eld than 
it is today. That said, it would be a shame not 
to exploit the enormous power and potential 
of these new methods. Even acknowledging 
their limitations, it is clear that they have a great 
deal to contribute to the study of group life.
With these brief introductory remarks, we 
turn the task of further exploration over to 
the contributors. They have produced a set of 
articles, each of which offers its own take on 
how neural measures data advance our under-
standing of intragroup and intergroup pro-
cesses. Taken together, these articles illustrate 
the versatility of neuroscience methods, the 
level of analysis they adopt, and how they can 
be used, in combination with behavioral and 
cognitive methods, to provide new insight into 
the psychology of group life. We hope that 
readers of this Special Issue come away edu-
cated about what neuroscience has to offer and 
perhaps thinking a little differently about their 
own research agendas.
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